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Leadership and social networks
Accounts of exceptional agency in political action often fail 
a litmus test of objectivity. Glorious leaders and inventive 
political entrepreneurs are coached in superlative terms that 
distract from an objective examination of their impact on 
decisions or collective goals. To decouple political action 
from notions of heroic agency requires examining actors as 
being potentially exceptional. This has to be done in tandem 
with an examination of the relational structures that could 
facilitate exceptional action. Leadership and political entre-
preneurship are the most commonly theorised exceptional 
political behaviours. In the present research design, we cap-
ture exceptionality as a behaviour, as a reputation and as a 
process. We consider this important for constructing realistic 
models of political outcomes which would provide compre-
hensive descriptions of political agency. As Hollander (1978) 
has convincingly claimed, leadership is produced by the 
right combination of leaders, followers and situations. 
Situations obviously determine opportunity structures and 
are fundamental in the likelihood for leaders to emerge. The 
implication is that we cannot consider agents in vitro, devoid 
of their structural context. Decision ‘situations’ entail an 
actor’s relational environment, what is often termed their 
social network. Leaders only exist within such a social con-
text. In that respect, we can consider the structure of actors’ 
relations to determine who among them are better placed to 
take advantage of opportunities for action.
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Abstract
Dominant streams in leadership literature conceptualise it either as a role within sociopolitical structure or as a behavioural 
predisposition of agents. Leadership roles are determined by decisional power, most typically related to the hierarchical 
and structural position of agents within sociopolitical networks. Limitations in attaining meaningful predictions of leader 
potential can be related to the separation of leadership as an agency attribute from leaders as structurally embedded agents. 
Social network analysis allows for the contingent examination of both. In this article, a number of hypotheses are tested via 
an empirical case study where interaction and affiliation networks across multiple decision experiments are coupled with 
attribute and psychometric data of the actors. In this quasi-experimental setting, leadership emergence is studied among four 
groups of undergraduate students faced with a decision choice in an iterative political simulation game. Findings suggest that in 
egalitarian political systems, centrality in social networks is directly associated with political success, while in political systems 
imbued with power inequalities successful actors are idiocentric brokers. Methodologically, this study frames role simulation 
games as quasi-experimental tests. Group interactions can be controlled, but vitally also incorporated in studies of perceptions, 
behaviours and group outcomes. The use of attitudinal micro-surveys, psychometric tests, observation and relational surveys 
is combined for a comprehensive mapping of group dynamics suited to questions of agency. In conclusion, there are a number 
of insights offered on deploying these methods in tandem and the challenges inherent in such a research design.
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Within groups, ‘decision making almost always involves 
some form of leadership’ (Dyer et al., 2009: 781). At the 
most elemental level of decision making, even an incremen-
tal action can generate a new outcome. The process can be 
construed as leadership if it results in a change in group 
dynamics or behaviour. Leadership is therefore inextricably 
linked with action, which is why it is often judged by the 
perceived effectiveness of agents in attaining outcomes. 
Evidence of leadership can therefore be sought in instances 
of change in relational structure or outcomes. Leadership can 
be conceptualised as the point at which an actor acquires 
agency, if the effect of the underlying action is transforma-
tive for a group.1
We contend here that it is not necessary to associate lead-
ership with ‘heroic’ individuals or indeed with extraordinary 
outcomes. This is reinforced by work demonstrating that a 
dominant individual or dominant group is not necessary for 
social outcomes to be generated (Dyer et al., 2009). A leader 
seen as one of potentially many agents whose actions alter 
the way a group behaves constitutes a much more realistic 
model of human behaviour as related to political decision 
making. In that respect, we are predominantly interested in 
mapping the social position and psychological predisposi-
tions of all agents in a social system. Social position can be 
surmised by the place actors occupy within their social net-
works and the status conferred through social hierarchies, 
while their predisposition (their propensity to act) can be 
inferred through psychometric evaluations of their personal-
ity or assessments of their actual behaviour.
When not confused by the messianic metaphysics of great 
leaders as heroic saviours, leadership is most often associ-
ated with generalised assumptions of charisma:
Charisma refers to the ability of a leader to exercise diffuse and 
intense influence over the beliefs, values, behaviour, and 
performance of others through his or her own behaviour, beliefs, 
and personal example. (House et al., 1991: 366)
So, charisma is seen to be determined by the personality 
of the leader, the relationship between leader and follower 
and the position of leaders in social structure (House et al., 
1991: 366). Charismatic leaders are seen to have an excep-
tional communication style that includes a captivating voice 
tone, making direct eye contact, showing animated facial 
expressions, while having a powerful, confident and dynamic 
interaction style (Kirkpatrick and Locke, 1996: 38). Political 
scientists have considered this type of charisma to be associ-
ated with rhetorical competence directed at changing the 
order of preferences of other actors (McLean, 2002; Riker, 
1986). At the same time, Balkundi et al. (2011) have found 
evidence that actors consider charismatic those that are cen-
tral, implying that actors could consider charismatic formal 
leaders because of their hierarchical role.
It is symptomatic of the glorifying assumptions of some 
authors in the leadership literature that these agents are 
assumed to be endowed with universally positive attributes. 
They are seen to be inspirational, effective, creative and 
powerful. They are assumed to be able to transform social 
groups and provide aspiration and vision to those they lead 
(Bass, 1985; Burns, 1978). Great leaders are seen to make a 
difference by transcending the ethos of their times. They 
make a difference by being different themselves (House 
et al., 1991).2 All these notions have been criticised as a 
romantic view of leaders, which amplifies their role in social 
change (Meindl et al., 1985). James Meindl (1995: 330) has 
further argued that the personality of the leader is not a sig-
nificant substantive and causal force on thoughts and actions 
of followers. Leadership is often subjective, borrowed from 
vernacular use, while it constitutes a composite of a number 
of different processes both at the individual and at the group 
and societal level (Meindl, 1995: 339). Meindl (1995) 
hypothesises that centrality will be inversely correlated with 
the group mean leadership construction (p. 337).3 This 
hypothesis can also be related to the work of Sparrowe and 
Liden (2005) who find that sharing trust ties with a leader is 
only beneficial if the leader is central in the organisational 
advice network.
The role of followers is also fundamental while it has 
been often overlooked. The follower needs to be not only 
amenable to presumed manipulation but also receptive to 
leadership.4 This is obviously related to the distribution of 
power within social groups and the potential for such power 
relations to be ritualised, to get institutionalised and to 
acquire permanence. Understanding the role of followers is 
also fundamental for comprehending social dynamics in 
situations where leadership is fluid or contested. To that end, 
it is not adequate to just model the behaviour of the occa-
sional leader but of the whole social system which they 
affect. Gary Yukl (1999) has pointed to the fact that ‘most 
people have dual roles as a leader and follower’ (p. 40). 
Looking at decision making in teams, Friedrich et al. (2009) 
find evidence that group tasks are achieved by collective 
leadership, where a number of individuals emerge as leaders 
to guide a group through specific challenges. This is a find-
ing also supported by the work of Schreiber and Carley 
(2008) who call for a paradigm shift away from notions of 
‘heroic’ leadership (p. 326).
Political agents are most often assumed self-interested 
utility maximisers (Arce, 2001; Holcombe, 2002), while 
belief and value systems are assumed to determine their 
behaviour (Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier, 1994). There is a 
long tradition in political science of assuming that ‘beliefs 
also provide norms, standards, and guidelines that influ-
ence the actor’s choice of strategy and tactics … [while] a 
belief system influences but does not unilaterally deter-
mine, decision making’ (George, 1969: 191). Preoccupation 
with decision making among leaders has also prompted 
interest in an agent’s cognitive map, political culture and 
ethics (George, 1969).
In the organisational behaviour literature, leadership 
interventions (as training, workshops, etc) are found to have 
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on average 66% positive outcomes compared to 34% for 
control groups based on a meta-analysis of 200 lab and field 
studies (Avolio et al., 2009). The implication is that leader-
ship behaviour can be learned and actors can adjust their 
behaviour to attain leadership outcomes. Dansereau et al. 
(1995) have also made the pertinent point that leaders change 
styles over time depending on the situation. While Ron Burt 
has further suggested that exceptional agents are probably 
those capable of shifting roles between brokerage and clo-
sure to suit the challenges of particular situations (Burt, 
2005; personal correspondence). Indeed it can be argued that 
leadership is associated with privileged positions in social 
structure, that is, the centrality or brokerage of actors. In the 
case of brokerage, Burt (2005) views leadership as one of the 
benefits of brokerage. When actors attain leadership based 
on some form of expertise, then their brokerage roles imply 
boundary spanning actors (Fleming and Waguespack, 2007). 
But in the context of political contest, leadership is more 
directly associated with reputation (Ahlquist and Levi, 2011) 
and brokerage facilitates the coordination tasks associated 
with a leadership role (Mehra et al., 2006). It is a fair assump-
tion that leader effectiveness depends on the ability of the 
leader to broker different clusters within their political sup-
port base. Indeed it is possible that an ability to maintain 
structural holes between clusters gives a leader the ability to 
capitalise on their brokerage (Burt, 2005). At the same time, 
leaders, by their prominence, are susceptible to being per-
ceived as Janus-faced since strong ties matter more than 
weak ones when the stakes are high (i.e. issue salience) 
(Krackhardt, 1990, 1992) and a leader in a brokerage posi-
tion would be torn between different group norms. The study 
of networks of power is inevitably linked to theories of struc-
tural balance and insights that can be derived from Simmel 
and Heider (Krackhardt and Handcock, 2007). At the same 
time, effective leadership is not solely determined by the 
interpersonal and relational skill of agents. We should also 
note the relevance of cognition and charisma examined in 
other parts of this article.
A strong preoccupation with agency can be seen as instru-
mentalist, while at the other end of the theoretical spectrum 
there are those that claim that agents play little role in social 
change and that social factors and institutional settings deter-
mine the behaviour of individuals. What can be broadly 
termed a structuralist argument maintains that agents are 
constrained within structures on which they have very lim-
ited control. It is not necessary to be drawn into the structure 
and agency debate or even to try the impossible task of oper-
ationalising Giddens’ (1984) concept of structuration to rec-
ognise that we have to integrate structural characteristics to 
accounts of agency. Bob Jessop (2002) has offered a valuable 
insight in that respect: structure and agency logically entail 
one another, and therefore, an analysis of agency should 
entail an analysis of structure. Anthony Giddens’ (1984) and 
Nikos Mouzelis (1995) have developed a theoretical argu-
ment on the duality of structure: structure is both the means 
and the outcome of human action.5 It is therefore counterpro-
ductive to attempt to distinguish one from the other. A con-
tingent representation of structure and agency can be 
achieved via an analysis of actor social networks.
Social networks, cognition and 
exceptional agency
There is a growing literature within Social Network Analysis 
(SNA) on exceptional leaders. This is most often published 
within the field of organisational behaviour and psychology. 
There are a number of pertinent insights that political sci-
ence can draw from this. The structure of organisations is 
seen to determine ‘opportunities and constraints for emer-
gent leaders’ (Balkundi and Kilduff, 2006: 422). Effective 
leaders are ‘aware of the relations between others; the 
strength and quality of ties among others; benefits and con-
tributions of others to the network and the existence of 
cleavages’ (Balkundi and Kilduff, 2006). The actions of 
rivals, social mobility, change in political resources among 
other actors and clustering within the social environment 
constitute fundamental information for effective political 
action. Of course all this assumes that political outcomes are 
the product of strategic action and intentional positioning 
among actors. This may not be the case. Political and social 
outcomes can be the result of random coincidence or the 
outcome of a process of a high order of complexity. In such 
a case, actors could not be expected to be effective strate-
gists.6 The extensive literature on leadership emergence 
(review in Ensari et al., 2011) has considered the way politi-
cal leaders fit prototypical qualities among a group (Foti 
et al., 1982) to emerge as leaders. Under the assumptions of 
this theory, leaders emerge through a competitive process 
that favours those that meet the task needs of the group (Foti 
and Hauenstein, 2007).
But a number of cognitive distortions determine leader-
ship perceptions. Humans, in perceiving their relational 
topology, regularly simplify social structure acting as ‘cogni-
tive misers’ (Krackhardt and Kilduff, 1999) and typically 
amplify the centrality of prominent actors. Distorting heuris-
tic shortcuts are well documented in prospect theory 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) and have been shown to 
regularly affect social agent assessment of opportunities and 
risk. The cognitive processes involved in purposeful action 
are shown to entail a ‘tension between reason and emotion’ 
(Frith and Singer, 2008: 3875), while the context of interfer-
ence between emotions and reason is influenced by ‘our 
sense of fairness, altruistic punishment, trust and framing 
effects’ (p. 3879). At the same time, affect and cognition are 
seen to be inextricably linked (Avolio et al., 2009: 780). This 
points to the limits of models of rational action as employed 
in game theoretic accounts.
According to Balkundi and Kilduff (2006), leadership can 
be explored with sociometric analysis by looking at evidence 
of an agent’s popularity, leadership and ‘borrowed glory’ 
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(p.433). Popularity can be measured by indegree centrality 
(number of incoming ties) as it has been demonstrated that 
high indegree has a positive effect on team performance 
(Balkundi and Kilduff, 2006). Betweeness centrality (being 
an intermediary between others) has also been associated 
with leadership (Balkundi and Kilduff, 2006). While borrow-
ing the glory of others implies being strategic in associating 
with others. Effective leaders therefore have high eigenvec-
tor centrality (globally best connected, taking account of 
local clusters) (Balkundi and Kilduff, 2006).
In this study, we will therefore test for effects of central-
ity on leadership by examining the following research 
questions:
RQ1. Perceptions of political leadership are positively 
associated with the standard measures of network central-
ity (namely, degree, Bonacich, eigenvector and betwee-
ness centrality).
This hypothesis is closely related to earlier work that 
associates centrality and power (Christopoulos and 
Ingold, 2015; Knoke et al., 1996; Laumann and Pappi, 
1976).
An influential analysis combining psychometric with 
sociometric data by Kalish and Robins (2006) finds that indi-
vidualistic and neurotic actors tend to maintain structural 
holes in their ego networks. Brokerage is directly associated 
with entrepreneurship and is typically considered as excep-
tional behaviour. Actors capable of bridging structural holes 
in social structure are assumed to engender personal and 
social benefits. We have used a scale developed by Burt et al. 
(1998) that measures the personality constraints on agents to 
capture those that are most likely to take exceptional struc-
tural positions. We accordingly examine the following:
RQ2. Agent personality constraint is associated with bro-
kerage roles in the social network.
Burt et al. (1998) found that people with low network 
constraint tended to be independent (idiocentrics) who 
thrived on change.
Of particular relevance to an analysis of political leader-
ship is the behaviour of political agents in environments 
where domination is not feasible or where it is unlikely. In 
most contemporary representative democratic systems, the 
most common strategy of political actors is one of coalition 
building and of managing their ties to powerful other actors. 
Coalition building decouples rank and power; ‘strategizing 
individuals must … base their decisions not only on observa-
bles, … but also on details of the differentiated relationships 
between individuals within the group’ (Barrett et al., 2007: 
562). Political actors depend on understanding the strength 
and type of relations among other actors in their environ-
ment. Indeed their ability to form coalitions depends on the 
accuracy of their horizon of observability (i.e. knowing the 
friends of their friends).7 It also depends on whether they can 
have a good cognitive map of sociopolitical exchange; 
indeed the degree to which they can achieve exceptional 
actions could very well depend on having an accurate cogni-
tion of political space (Christopoulos, 2006).8
Humphrey (1976) has proposed that primates have to deal 
with an ephemeral and ambiguous social environment that 
leads them to develop ‘social intelligence’. Indeed social 
structure complexity involves interactions between individu-
als, the quality and frequency of relations, as well as the pat-
terns of social structure (Hinde, 1976). Taking into account 
the fact that the relational environment is relatively fluid and 
that social environments are rarely homogeneous gives a 
measure of the cognitive task facing social agents. Ability to 
navigate the constantly shifting social network maize deter-
mines the success of political agents.9 This underpins our 
interest in social complexity and the multiplex parallel agent 
relations.10 Social actors have to maintain multiple roles 
within an environment that is too complex for any single 
actor to comprehend. Pentland (2007) has developed these 
arguments to claim that group decisions take advantage of 
collective human intelligence.11
Schreiber and Carley (2008: 327) have suggested that to 
advance our understanding of the agency of leadership, we 
need to also take a longitudinal perspective as well as con-
duct a multilevel analysis of the complex organisations 
within which agents are embedded. This would account for 
the fact that agents are not homogeneous just because they 
belong to the same interaction system. There is indeed a call 
for theories that would be geared to account for the dynamic, 
heterogeneous and path creative possibility of leadership 
action within network systems (Kilduff et al., 2008: 97) as 
well as the spatial geometry of their interaction space 
(Vallacher and Nowak, 2008).
The political capital of exceptional 
agents
Political capital has been hypothesised to consist of a multi-
tude of different resources. Most often, it is confounded with 
social capital (Lin, 2002) or is perceived as a reputational 
resource of agents. Indeed transactional political capital can 
be seen as some form of credit conceptualised as ‘exchange 
units’ expended by leaders attempting to influence followers 
(House et al., 1991: 364). In Sørensen and Torfing (2003), 
‘political capital refers to the individual powers to act politi-
cally that are generated through participation in interactive 
political processes linking civil society to the political sys-
tem’ (p. 610). They refer to access to decision making as 
endowment, capability to make a difference as empower-
ment and their perception of themselves as political identity 
(Sørensen and Torfing, 2003). Diverging from the definition 
offered by Sørensen and Torfing (2003) who consider 
endowment to also entail rights and competencies of actors 
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(p. 624), we instead define two key determinants of actor 
political capital: (1) an actor’s endowment of political 
resources and (2) their empowerment through political insti-
tutions or social structure.
Endowment is an intangible resource that actors project 
and deploy in their political space, and empowerment is the 
institutional and sociopolitical structure that determines their 
opportunities and constraints. In classic definitions of politi-
cal power (Lukes, 2005; Scott, 2001), political capital 
endowment is considered as a resource that accrues to politi-
cal agents. And although the vagaries of political life can dis-
tort the distribution or success of political endeavour, it 
should be acknowledged that this resource grows commen-
surate with the political power of actors. Political capital is 
sometimes employed synonymously to reputation or power 
but it should not be confused as identical. So, political capital 
endowment could be seen as an actor-controlled resource 
that gets augmented the more successful an actor is at achiev-
ing specific political outcomes. Sørensen and Torfing (2003) 
have found that ‘those that have a considerable amount of 
political capital increase it even further by virtue of their par-
ticipation in governance networks’ (p. 632). In political sys-
tems, not all agents have the same initial endowment. Or as 
Sørensen and Torfing (2003) claim, the operating principle 
seems to be ‘to those who have, more shall be given’ 
(p. 627).12 An uneven distribution in the initial level of politi-
cal capital of agents makes a difference on their ability to 
further accumulate this resource:
RQ3. Initial political resource allocations affect the suc-
cess of agents at amassing endowment political 
capital.
If this statement can be generalised, there are obvious 
implications for democratic political systems. If early 
uneven distribution of political resources could exagger-
ate an actor’s political power, then representative democ-
racies are not equipped with the institutional structures 
that would produce a level playing field for political 
participation.
Empowerment political capital is measured here through 
an analysis of the social structure and interaction between the 
agents in the quasi-experimental setting of a decision simula-
tion. Assessing political decisions accounts for the institu-
tional and organisational constraints of agents.13
Methodology: a decision simulation in a 
quasi-experimental research design
Participants
To test some assumptions in the literature and to create a reli-
able setting for measuring the effect of social networks on 
decision making and the emergence of leadership, we have 
monitored the behaviour of four small groups of second- and 
third-year undergraduate student volunteers during a series 
of decision simulation games. This constituted part of an 
assessed course on European Union (EU) politics that stu-
dents attended during Fall 2009 in England (procedural 
details in Appendix 1). A total of 36 students (average age: 
22.5 years; standard deviation (SD): 3.56) were randomly 
assigned to four different groups.14 A protocol was designed 
to control for the accrual of political capital in political action 
and to measure their political behaviour taking account of 
their pre-existing and evolving social networks. We also cap-
tured their propensity for action and their impressions of the 
leadership of others.
Procedure
The volunteers were surveyed on multiple aspects of their 
interaction over an 8-week period during which they had to 
decide on four different policy questions in four meetings 
that lasted 50 minutes on average. The decision task implied 
they had to reach a majority decision. Votes were by secret, 
attributable ballot. After each vote, their voting choice was 
made public. During the four events, students took between 
one and four ballots to reach a majority decision. In total, 
groups held between seven and nine ballots in the course of 
the four sessions. Multiple decision choices on a variety of 
topics within a decision game render this a quasi-experimen-
tal design. Hypotheses are therefore explored inductively in 
the present design.
Treatment and control groups
The experimental group had differential initial voting 
weights that were amended upwards by 20% every time 
they were on the majority coalition. In effect, their politi-
cal capital increased if they were successful at placing 
themselves on a winning coalition. To do so, they would 
need to have a fair understanding of the relations among 
others. By announcing their voting preferences after they 
all had cast their votes, actors became subject to relational 
dynamics including non-reciprocation costs. By recognis-
ing that there are multiple future iterations of similar deci-
sions, actors were expected to treat each voting event as 
part of a series of iterated games. Difference in voting 
weights was on the order of 1:3 at the beginning of the 
decision simulations and reached 1:7 by the end of the vot-
ing iterations, reflecting the consistency of success of 
some actors in the decision experiments. Actors in control 
groups had equal voting weight across all decision games. 
The experimental condition was designed to represent 
political environments where political actors are endowed 
with differential intangible resources and where their suc-
cess in political interaction is reflected in the growth of 
those resources and influence. This intangible resource is 
well captured by the theoretical notion of endowment 
political capital.15
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Micro-surveys
In order to maintain the interest and engagement of student 
volunteers, surveys were short and frequent. In this way, we 
are confident of marginal cross-contamination of the differ-
ent types of data collected (attribute, sociometric and psy-
chometric). Each survey instrument was designed to take 
less than 10 minutes to complete. These consisted of a longi-
tudinal survey on social interaction (four issues), a survey on 
their cognitive assessments of social structure, a short psy-
chometric survey of their personality16 and a survey on lead-
ership attributes of others in their group.17 Reported analysis 
is based on surveys that have attained over 81% response 
rates except for leadership assessments of team members 
where we managed just over 52%. Surveys were completed 
by volunteers with minimal inducements or sanctions which 
made 100% response rates unlikely. Volunteers who partici-
pated in less than three of four events have been eliminated 
from this analysis.18 This attrition poses obvious limitations 
on the analysis and interpretation of results.
Operationalisation
We next outline concept proxies and list the variables 
employed. We seek to make data and validity limitations 
apparent and explicit. To investigate the relationship between 
network centrality and leadership (RQ1), we have employed 
an assessment of reported peer leadership. Respondents were 
requested to rate ‘colleagues on their leadership in building 
successful coalitions during the simulation game’ on a 
5-point Likert scale.19 They were also asked to rate a number 
of attributes such as respect, trust, confidence, domination 
and communication skill. We aggregated and binarised the 
data to indicate a positive perception of leadership and other 
attributes for the top 2 choices of the Likert scale. Centrality 
measures reported are among those most frequently 
employed, namely: degree centrality (number of ties), 
betweeness centrality (number of times an actor is in the geo-
desic between others), eigenvector centrality (a centrality 
measure that takes account of global connectedness) and 
Bonacich power (a centrality measure that weights the effect 
of being connected to well connected others).
The instrument measuring personality constraints and its 
association with brokerage (RQ2) is borrowed from Burt 
et al. (1998). A 10-item scale generates a score. High values 
on this scale, according to the authors, indicate actors in 
search of authority that thrive on change, while low values 
indicate actors that value security and stability. Again the 
scale was binarised, with positive values for those with 
above-average scores within their cohort.
Finally, to account for the effect of the variations between 
treatment and control groups in the allocation in voting rights 
and aggregation of political capital (RQ3), we measured the 
ratio of times an actor was on the winning coalition (winner 
variable) and account for their initial voting endowment.
Controls
In the present quasi-experimental design, we do not control 
for decision options of agents or the process through which 
they reach a decision. Original positions were not mapped, 
and therefore, actor motivation is assumed to be associated 
with experimental incentives and the natural competitiveness 
of agents. The ability of agents to engage in discussion and 
exchange information or opinion beyond the confines of the 
decision game environment further limits the generalisability 
of conclusions that can be offered here.
Empirical evidence
We first conduct a multidimensional scaling (MDS) analy-
sis of the actor attribute, sociometric and behavioural vari-
ables to explore the associations between them (Graph 1). 
The data set is aggregated for the treatment and control 
groups.
As evident in the MDS graphs for both parts of the data 
set, there is a distinction between attribute variables (com-
munication skills, confidence etc), sociometric variables 
(indegree, outdegree, etc), psychometric assessment and 
frequency with which they have been on the winning coali-
tion. These groupings are more clear in the case of the treat-
ment group.
A general analysis of the four groups in this study indi-
cates that they have developed different network dynamics. 
After 8 weeks of interaction, we see evidence of a difference 
in core-periphery structures and centralisation. Table 1 
details these differences in sociometric values.
There is great variation in elemental network structure. 
The differences are larger among the treatment groups than 
among the control groups, which are relatively homogene-
ous. As evident from looking at the graph depiction of the 
four groups (Graph 2), there is wide variation in network 
structure here. Treatment 1 is very centralised, has a pro-
nounced core-periphery structure and has low density and 
low levels of transitivity, compared to the other groups. 
Treatment 2 and control 2 have very similar network struc-
ture, while control 1 has higher reciprocity but lower transi-
tivity from the latter two. This mixed picture of network 
structure, although not ideal for exploring the hypotheses set, 
we consider realistic of group dynamics. Thankfully, for the 
philosophers of free will, human agents are not cellular 
automata. At the same time, the variations in network struc-
ture could pose some problems of interpretation and indicate 
the need for further experiments and a validation of results 
on the basis of simulations.
Peer-assessed leadership is found to be positively and 
significantly associated with different measures of centrality 
for the control but not the treatment groups. It is correlated 
to agent popularity (indegree centrality), brokerage (betwee-
ness centrality), global connectedness (eigenvector central-
ity) and connectedness to powerful others (Bonacich power) 
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in the control groups (Table 2). For the more politically real-
istic case of treatment groups, where political power varies 
among actors, we find no strong evidence of an association. 
Beyond the obvious small n limitations of this analysis, we 
could assume that equal voting weights (control condition) 
create the preconditions for central actors to benefit from 
their structural position and dominate by exercising leader-
ship. An inherited differentiated power structure (treatment 
condition) allows network peripheral actors to dominate 
resources without obliging them to invest in social interac-
tion. Actors with high levels of political capital do not need 
to be central to create a pull to their position at the time of 
coalition formation.
In Graph 3, we have a clear depiction of the variation in 
success between the treatment and control groups. In the 
control groups, the most central actors are the most suc-
cessful. Social centrality translates to influence in political 
interaction. In the treatment groups, the opposite seems to 
be the case. Peripheral actors (even an isolate) are most 
successful in coalition formation. Leadership of the group 
is determined by the relative weight of the initial endow-
ment. This seems to follow the biblical parable in Mathew 
13:12, ‘those that have will be given more’. A linear regres-
sion with the dependent variable being the percentage 
of times on the winning coalition finds a significant asso-
ciation with initial endowment for the treatment groups 
(adj. R2: .238; b: .532; sig.: .023), while in the control 
groups the significant association is with eigenvector cen-
trality (adj. R2:.364; b: .634; sig.: .005).
This preoccupation with initial political allocations is the 
theme of our third hypothesis. Initial political resource allo-
cations indeed affect the success of agents at amassing 
endowment political capital. We employ logistic regression 
to attempt and determine whether being on a winning coali-
tion can be predicted through attributes or sociometric char-
acteristics of agents.
The only significant predictor variable in both the linear 
and the logistic regression for treatment groups is leadership. 
Explaining low levels of variance does not allow us high pre-
dictive validity, while the exclusion of all other variables 
denies us the option of comparatively assessing the effect of 
different variables on the dependent variable. However, con-
trol groups demonstrate stronger associations. Whether a per-
son was highly central between others and whether they 
dominated the discussion were significantly and linearly asso-
ciated with the possibility of being in a winning coalition. 
Their overall network centrality (eigenvector) was also associ-
ated with their probability of being in a winning coalition in 
Table 1. Treatment and control group differences in network structure.
Density Transitivitya Transitivityb Graph clustering Reciprocity Centralisation
Treatment 1 0.155 17.6 5.8 0.267 0.272 67.7
Treatment 2 0.321 57.1 27.9 0.622 0.384 44.7
Control 1 0.375 38.5 17.7 0.489 0.500 35.9
Control 2 0.319 63.6 32.1 0.498 0.352 33.4
Directed data of interactions between groups.
aPercentage of ordered triples in which i → j and j → k that are transitive.
bPercentage of triangles with at least two legs that have three legs. Definitions of concepts in Wasserman and Faust (1994).
Graph 1. MDS of key variables in the treatment and control groups.
Proxscal, Euclidean distance model; normalised raw stress .014 and .018, respectively.
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the logistic regression model. Overall, as with the correlations, 
the control groups produce more robust results, (Table 3).
Discussion
The statistical analysis indicates a relationship between 
political endowment and political impact.20 An unequal dis-
tribution of power in the treatment groups skews the proba-
bility of actors to gain more power. When there is substantial 
variegation of power, then there are also many structural 
holes. Actors with most power are not always prepared to 
play the role of brokers. Indeed they are likely to be less 
social than others and have fewer connections than average. 
It appears that social space in the control groups is more 
dynamic, with actors’ centrality more directly associated 
with their success in the game.
We found evidence of support to an association between 
centrality and group perceptions of leadership for the control 
but not the treatment groups (RQ1). At the same time, there 
was only marginal association between our psychometric 
proxy for authoritative behaviour and betweeness centrality 
on the treatment group (RQ2). This was the only significant 
association observed indicating that the measure does not 
correlate well with centrality in our data set. As originally 
assumed, centrality was the key predictor of the success of 
agents for the control groups, while initial endowment was 
Graph 2. Multidimensional scaling of reported interactions between agents: (a) T1 and T2 and (b) C1 and C2.
Data dichotomised, eigenvector weighted.
Table 2. Correlations of leadership and authority assessments with network centrality.
Indegree Inbonacich Eigenvector normalised Betweeness
Leadership Treatment −.134 −.132 −.231 .048
 Control .434* .485** .776*** .577**
Authority Treatment .255 .299 .251 .473**
 Control .054 .075 .396 .165
Significance indicated at *<.1; **<.01; ***<.001.
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the highest predictor in treatment groups (RQ3). The periph-
eral position of actors with most resources in the treatment 
groups was instructive of their role in the network.
The two key insights of our analysis is the association of 
brokerage to leadership (RQ2) and evidence of the Matthew 
effect in the groups studied (RQ3). Beyond the obvious 
caveats to generalisation offered in other parts of this article, 
it is important to point out that each of these findings merits 
further research attention. Brokerage here is associated with 
a crude proxy of brokerage, betweenness centrality, which 
entails both medial and radial features (see Brandes et al., 
2012). More sophisticated measures of brokerage such as 
honest brokerage or Burt’s structural hole measures (see 
Christopoulos and Ingold, 2015) hold the promise of a more 
accurate picture of privileged network positions to per-
ceived leadership. At this point, we can merely deduce that 
Table 3. Success as measured by being on the winning coalition.
Logistic regression
 Nagelkerke R2 Independent variables B (exp) Sig.
Treatment .300 Leadership 2.35 .060
Control .664 Eigenvector .296 .044
Linear Regression
 Adj. R2 Independent variables B Sig.
Treatment .185 Leadership .482 .043
Control .554 Betweeness .473 .016
 Dominated .465 .018
Graph 3. Multidimensional scaling of reported interactions weighted by success in coalition formation: (a) T1 and T2 variations in 
endowment political capital and (b) C1 and C2 equal endowment in political capital.
Red nodes are endowed with higher voting weights at the beginning of the series of simulations.
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the psychometric profile of agents is associated with their 
brokerage in political networks. This is not surprising and 
has been confirmed in a number of studies of organisational 
behaviour beyond political settings (Avolio et al., 2009). 
The fact that a strong Matthew effect is detected under 
quasi-experimental conditions in political networks is well 
within theoretical expectations. What has not been deter-
mined with the present analysis and remains to be resolved 
in tests of higher explanatory power is the relative impact of 
networks versus actor power. In other words, it is evident 
that political power (as political capital) and relations affect 
the leadership effectiveness and reputation of actors, but 
what has not been determined is the relative impact of each 
one to actor effectiveness.
Research design implications
The use of role simulation games to teach political science is 
well established (Asal and Blake, 2006; Gredler, 2004), but 
their use in collecting relational data is less common (Enfield 
et al., 2012). In this project, we use role simulations in order 
to deal with the research challenge of situating actors within 
the context of group decisions. This design has allowed us to 
investigate the effect of actor affiliations in their success on 
leading others. It also allowed examining a fundamental 
research hypothesis of political action, namely, the effect of 
unequal distributions of power on its aggrandisement. A high 
degree of realism in the simulation was feasible due to the 
familiarity of volunteers with the decision context. This 
includes the rules and practice of weighted voting within 
majoritarian executive meetings, such as the ones of the EU 
Council under Treaty of Nice rules. At the same time, the 
high levels of simulation granularity (i.e. the use of a realistic 
scenario) increase not only student motivation (Gredler, 
2004) but also the complexity of data collection while it can 
proliferate potential confounding factors. Appendix 1 pre-
sents an outline of the simulations protocol. Beyond apparent 
limitations associated with small n studies, there are a num-
ber of other caveats which are considered next.
The research design stipulates the collection of five dif-
ferent types of data from a group tasked with taking a policy 
decision. These are as follows: (a) relational data, (b) psy-
chometrics, (c) attitudinal data, (d) cognitive data and (e) 
voting and decisions. Different instruments and protocols 
had to be devised for each one of these data types as outlined 
in Appendix 1. The use of micro-surveys of three to four 
questions was designed to take less than 10 minutes to com-
plete, so as to limit participant fatigue. These instruments 
were not tested for sequence effects as they were adminis-
tered separately, but this concern merits further methodologi-
cal scrutiny. A key concern in deploying a barrage of such 
instruments is the compatibility of the underlying assump-
tions to the methodological traditions informing them. As 
firmly empiricist, all are judged fundamentally compatible 
on their epistemological assumptions, although the observa-
tional task (e) could be conceived as interpretivist under 
certain conditions. In such a case, an analysis of this type of 
data could follow a mixed-methods design. The key chal-
lenge with the current research design was to ascertain con-
tent and construct validity of individual instruments while 
guaranteeing they would not ‘cross-contaminate’ answers in 
follow-up instruments. For that reason, (c) attitudinal and (d) 
cognitive data were sequenced to be collected after simulated 
decisions had been reached. Participants were therefore 
innocent of the study’s research questions on leadership and 
could only have recognised a research interest on their social 
networks. Overall, the use of quasi-experimental designs for 
the study of political action and behaviour is strongly sup-
ported by the findings attained in this series of experiments. 
The methodological direction employed has offered insights 
to a number of substantive research questions that lay beyond 
our reach before such a design was employed.21
Conclusion
This study looked at how group leadership is affected by the 
power of agents and their social networks. An attempt has 
been made to associate the decisional power of agents with 
their social networks by looking at how their network posi-
tion may impact their effectiveness while forming coalitions. 
A core assumption is that the role of exceptional agents, the 
leaders and political entrepreneurs of academic folklore 
impacts decision systems. An underlying assumption has 
been that social networks as they reflect on the affinity 
between agents could also be predictors of their collabora-
tion. This is going beyond mainstream studies of influence 
through network analysis, where political interaction net-
works are documented to affect decision making, by their 
impact on influence and power flows (Christopoulos and 
Ingold, 2015; Christopoulos and Quaglia, 2009; Henning, 
2009; Knoke et al., 1996; Pappi and Henning, 1998).
The aim of this study has been to identify those agents 
most likely to be successful in political decision making. 
This was situated in a critique of the literature on leadership 
and political entrepreneurship to suggest that agent roles 
should not be considered as binary states and that their 
impact on decision making is likely to change through time. 
Network analysis, with the production of agent relational 
metrics, allows for a useful classification of the relational 
capacity of agents. Network capacity can be seen as a com-
posite proxy of multiple actor attributes. By mapping their 
relative position to one another, relational advantage is made 
explicit.
This study found that leadership and network centrality 
are associated in balanced power systems, but not in political 
systems where some actors are more powerful than others. In 
those latter groups, there is evidence of an association 
between idiocentric personalities and brokerage roles. 
Concurring with Sørensen and Torfing (2003) and Torfing 
(2003), there is evidence that starting with higher political 
resources leads to political capital aggregation. A number of 
early democracies recognised the threat to the rule of the 
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many by unequal distributions in political capital among 
their citizens. Different forms of ostracism were devised as 
blunt remedies.22 The aggregation of political capital pro-
vides a challenge to democratic institutions. In ancient socie-
ties, such power concentration was often associated with 
strong familial or clan ties, and their political expression was 
nepotism. It is beyond the scope of this study to explore the 
implications of the ‘Matthew effect’ on the health of demo-
cratic institutions, but it represents a fertile and important 
future direction of theoretical inquiry.
More sophisticated hypotheses on the effect of social net-
work on political action will have to wait until more compre-
hensive data sets are created. Can perceptions of leadership be 
related to political attainment? Furthermore, does the accuracy 
of an agent’s cognitive social/political map determine their 
political advantage? Do actors switch roles across different 
political settings and do they indeed shift between excep-
tional–ordinary, leader–follower, brokerage–closure and cen-
tre–periphery roles across time? Successful political actors are 
assumed to have high social intelligence, exhibit role ambigui-
ties and be more accurate in their exercise of heuristic 
shortcuts. Understanding their behaviour would require a lon-
gitudinal assessment that would involve capturing many dif-
ferent types of data. Quasi-experimental designs offer a way to 
record such data and substantiate insights that can comple-
ment those gained through qualitative in-depth studies of 
exceptional actors or computed simulations of political agency.
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Notes
 1. There is a long tradition of examining cooperative decisions via 
the outcomes of cooperative games (Axelrod, 1997; Axelrod 
and Hamilton, 1981). Frameworks such as the prisoner’s 
dilemma which do not lend themselves to a typical multi-
player, multi-strategy, non-zero-sum political environment are 
used. Beyond useful theoretical insights on the present value of 
future risk or the distinction between individual and collective 
risk (Read and Shapiro, 2014), this literature typically simpli-
fies power to adversarial representations that lack credence in 
most political contest.
 2. The most frequently employed leadership psychometric instru-
ment is called the multifactor leadership questionnaire where 
personality traits called transformational and transactional 
leadership are measured (Avolio et al., 2009; Schriesheim 
et al., 2009).
 3. James Meindl (1995: 336) also hypothesises isopraxism. He 
suggests that group level processes are in place that cause 
members of groups to share leadership concepts and through 
social influence develop similar leadership behaviours.
 4. Barling et al. (1996) claim that ‘charisma and transformational 
leadership are often used synonymously’ (p. 827). The latter is 
best understood to entail charisma, intellectual stimulation and 
individualised consideration towards followers. See also Bono 
and Ilies (2006) and Reicher et al. (2007).
 5. A good critique and appraisal of Giddens’ work can be found 
in Jessop (2005) who claims that ‘one cannot adequately con-
ceptualise structural constraints outside specific time-horizons 
and spatial scales of action’ (p. 53).
 6. The centrality of leaders is found to affect team performance 
(Balkundi and Harrison, 2006).
 7. The work of Noah Friedkin (1998) is instrumental in under-
standing the constraints imposed by the network horizon of 
agents.
 8. Cognition in a dynamic social environment cannot be divorced 
from an actor’s agency. Dynamic interactions are cognitive 
acts while a ‘task is carried out partly in the individual’s head 
and partly in its environment’ Barrett et al. (2007: 571). The 
limited psychometric instruments of this study do not allow us 
to make a strong claim for measuring personality states, and it 
is possible that we are only capturing behavioural traits of the 
agents studied. Cognitive bias associated with decision mak-
ing and the selection of leaders are examined in evolutionary 
leadership theory (van Vugt and Ronay, 2014). Exceptionality 
can also be associated to the ‘acuity of leader cognitions’ 
Balkundi and Kilduff (2006: 422).
 9. It has been argued that social understanding may be a form of 
pattern recognition involving active perceptions (Noe, 2004).
10. Yuval Kalish has described leadership emergence as fluid (per-
sonal correspondence).
11. It has been further argued that we should distinguish between 
individual and collective cognition and therefore address the 
question of whether leadership is a property of individuals or 
systems (Lord and Emrich, 2001).
12. This has also been called the Matthew effect (Merton, 1968) 
and accumulated advantage (Watts, 2004).
13. A comprehensive account would integrate the political identity 
of agents and the relevance of identity to political culture. See 
Christopoulos (2008) for a critique of the policy networks litera-
ture on that score.
14. Figures exclude an outlier who would raise the average age to 
23.9 years and the standard deviation (SD) to 8.2 years. The 
ratio of males to females is 2.6:1 which is typical for the field 
of social science from which students were recruited.
15. This is deemed to be a field-experiment as there are a number 
of possible confounding factors that cannot be controlled for 
(Margetts and Stoker, 2010; Stoker, 2010).
16. This was the same instrument (with minor alterations) 
employed by Burt et al. (1998) that identified those with low 
scores with those seeking security and stability, while those 
with high scores are perceived as independent outsiders, in 
search of authority and thriving on change.
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17. There was also a simulation evaluation that does not constitute 
part of the study and a video record of the last decision event for 
all groups that was employed to determine discussion dominance.
18. Between one and two people per group (six in total) are elimi-
nated through this ‘low-motivation’ filter. These were peo-
ple who typically only participated once and appear socially 
peripheral in the affiliation networks of their group.
19. We note the limitations in employing peer assessment with-
out a reference to the social networks of the assessors and the 
assessed, as discussed in Luria and Kalish (2013).
20. Obviously, any attempt at inferential tests of significance 
should take account of network dependence (Robins et al., 
2012). As our conclusions are not attempting generalisations, 
the use of sophisticated simulations via the use of Markov 
chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) models is not reported here.
21. A follow-up series of experimental designs has been imple-
mented and the results are currently analysed.
22. Ostracism in 6th-century Athenian democracy, according to 
the Cleisthenes constitution of 507 BC, provided for the ban-
ishment for 10 years of one citizen each year whose power 
was deemed to threaten the demos. Its restricted use has led 
commentators to note (Rhodes, 1986; Thomsen, 1972) that it 
functioned as a mechanism for diffusing political conflict.
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Appendix 1
Procedure protocols and data collection: decision 
making in a multimethod simulation game
General context. This simulation game is designed to meas-
ure the interaction of political actors in a competitive deci-
sion-making environment. It is unique in collecting a great 
number of different data related to the decision process. In 
this study, four groups were monitored over four decision 
games that were organised fortnightly over an 8-week period.
We measured (a) the interactions among actors as reported 
in a series of network surveys, (b) the degree to which actors 
are idiocentric through a psychometric test, (c) attitudinal data, 
(d) cognitive maps of relational space through the assessment 
of the interaction among others in their group and (e) their deci-
sions and votes in each session. We also took (f) video record-
ings of their interactions during the last decision game. We did 
not, in this instance, collect data on (g) their political prefer-
ences and (h) decisional preferences before group interaction.
Volunteers were asked to debate and take four decisions 
while assigned roles as representatives of a number of 
European Union (EU) member states. The topics were cho-
sen for their prominence. These roles were randomly 
assigned. The decisions consisted of formulating new policy 
and the selection of key personnel:
1. Implementation of EU common asylum policy;
2. Implementation of the political solidarity clause in 
the Lisbon Treaty;
3. Selection of President of the EU Council;
4. Selection of an EU Foreign Minister.
Following is an example of abridged instructions for the 
second game:
Make a statement on how your country interprets article 42.7 
(political solidarity) in the Lisbon Treaty and what are the 
foreseen areas of conflict in creating common interests in CFSP 
from your country’s perspective. You are expected to vote on 
EU action in Iran, Iraq or Palestine.
Student actors were issued with information on the policy 
context. They were instructed that they did not have to fol-
low the original position of the countries they were assigned 
to study during the voting process and indeed were encour-
aged to seek coalitions with other actors in order to get their 
preferred policy option approved.
Procedure rules (instructions to participants)
1. You are assigned a country randomly at the beginning 
of term, which you will represent in all subsequent 
games;
2. The voting importance of a country is either (a) signi-
fied by a value that we will call its political capital 
(PC) or (b) is equal among all countries depending on 
which group you are assigned;
3. Voting is conducted by secret on named ballots;
4. Simple majorities in favour win a ballot;
5. There will be a total of four decision rounds;
6. Decision games will last for half an hour and prepara-
tions for each game will take 20 minutes.
For groups assigned PC votes (a), the following rules also 
apply:
7. Supporting a decision you assign that position your 
PC votes;
8. When you are on the winning coalition, you gain 
20% on your PC votes that increase your voting 
weight on the next round;
9. Amended PC weights are visible to all on actors’ 
name plates.
Rewards. A winner will be identified for each class deter-
mined by the number of times they are on the winning coali-
tion. Those on the majority coalition after each decision 
round receive a small treat to re-enforce attainment. Overall, 
winners are rewarded with book tokens after each game. 
Minor re-enforcements were deemed necessary to maintain 
student motivation and trigger competitiveness for being on 
a winning coalition.
Example of calculating PC votes
Stage 1. Agenda-setting decision between three policy 
options. Country vote is cast as follows:
Stage 2. As no overall majority is reached, option with 
least votes eliminated and new voting round commences 
between the top 2 preferences. Germany and Poland increase 
their PC weight by being associated (voting) with the first 
ranked position. Germany would now have a larger relative 
weight: WGt2 = (WGt1 × 0.2) + WGt1 = (29 × 0.2) + 29 = 35 PC 
(rounded) for the next decision round.
EU response to the conflict between Georgia and Russia over 
Abkhazia.
Position 1 Position 2 Position 3
Favour Georgia No policy change Favour Abkhazia
 Germany 29 PC UK 29 PC Spain 27 PC
 Poland 27 PC Portugal 12 PC Sweden 10 PC
Total 56 PC 41 PC 37 PC
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